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Sammendrag 
Vi studerer finansielle porteføljevalg blant norske husholdninger og finner klare mønstre over 
livsløpet. I analysen bruker vi administrative data for perioden 1995-2009. Andelen av husholdningene 
som deltar i aksje (og fonds-) markedet er lav blant de yngre, men øker gjennom arbeidslivet og når en 
topp rundt pensjonsalder. Deretter forlater husholdningene aksjemarkedet gradvis mot slutten av 
livsløpet. 
 
For de husholdningene som deltar i aksjemarkedet er andelen av finansformue som investeres i aksjer 
høy og stabil blant de yngre, men reduseres gradvis etter hvert som pensjonsalderen kommer nærmere. 
Fra pensjonsalder holdes andelen investert i aksjer tilnærmet konstant.  
 
Eksisterende livsløpsmodeller kan gjøre rede for den observerte deltakelsen men ikke 
porteføljeandelen over livsløpet. Vi viser at ved å inkludere i en slik modell en årlig kostnad for 
deltakelse i aksjemarkedet, samt også en liten sannsynlighet for store tap når man investerer i 
aksjemarkedet at modellen kan reprodusere disse to livsløpsmønstrene. 
1 Introduction
Over the past decade a number of contributions have re-examined the life cycle behaviour
of investors’ portfolio. Inspired by empirical findings from novel microeconomic data on
households portfolios, several papers have provided new models of the life cycle portfolio
of individual investors that go beyond the seminal models of Mossin (1968), Samuelson
(1969) and Merton (1969).
These earlier contributions have two sharp predictions: first, even in a dynamic setting,
individuals should, at all points in their life-cycle invest a share of their wealth in risky
assets. That is, independently of age, all investors should participate in the stock market -
an extension of the participation principle in a static setting to a dynamic context. Second,
assuming complete markets and in the absence of labor income, the share invested in the
risky asset should be age-invariant. Thus, the portfolio, either described by the ownership
of risky assets or by their share in total wealth, exhibits no life cycle pattern. However, the
absence of rebalancing over the life cycle predicted by these earlier models is not robust
to the (realistic) presence of human capital. As shown by Merton (1971), the presence of
tradeable human capital in a complete market setting implies that since human capital
is riskless and tradeable, it plays the same role as a large endowment of riskless bonds.
It therefore creates a strong incentive to invest in risky securities when abundant, that
is early in the life cycle, and to rebalance away from them as people get older and their
human wealth shrinks. Importantly, this basic implication carries over to more complex
environments that feature non-insurability of labor income and incomplete markets, as
shown by several computational models of life cycle portfolio investments reviewed in
Section 2 that amend the Samuelson-Merton model in one or more dimensions to add
doses of realism. All these models uniformly predict that individuals should rebalance
toward a safer portfolio as they approach retirement and the driving force is the life cycle
pattern of human capital. On the other hand, without additional assumptions, they still
imply that people should participate in the stock market.
In contrast, microeconomic data on household portfolios seem to show two remarkable
features: first, not only participation in the stock market is limited at all ages but it
tends to follow a life cycle pattern - in many instances a hump-shaped one (see Haliassos,
Guiso, and Jappelli 2001). Second, the share invested in stocks tends to vary little with
age, though in this case the specific empirical pattern is more controversial. Summarizing
evidence for several countries, Haliassos, Guiso, and Jappelli (2001) argue that the age
profile of the share of risky assets conditional on participation is relatively flat, though in
some instances “there does seem to be some moderate rebalancing of the portfolio away
from risky securities”as people age. Thus, a reasonable characterization of the empirical
findings is that participation in risky assets follows a hump-shaped profile while the share
invested varies little, if at all, with age. But how solid is the evidence on which this char-
acterization rests? The empirical finding that people do not rebalance their risky portfolio
share over the life cycle sounds particularly puzzling because rebalancing is implied by an
indisputable fact of life - the decrease in the stock of human capital as people age.
While the lack of participation is a robust feature of the data, there are at least three
reasons to doubt the empirical patterns over age in both participation and the portfolio
share. First, most of the available evidence is obtained from cross sectional data. Hence,
inferences on the age pattern of the portfolio must be drawn from comparisons of portfolio
holdings of individuals of different age, rather than of the same individual as his age varies.
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If individuals of different age differ in un-observables that are correlated with age, the
estimated age pattern may reflect the former not the latter, in particular, cohort effects.
Panel data may help sorting this out: though adding an extra source of variation to the
data (time) also adds the need to model it, if one can impose reasonable restrictions on time
effects one can then distinguish the effect of age from that of year of birth. Second, most
studies ignore the fact that the risky portfolio share is only defined for the participants
in the risky assets markets and that participation in assets markets is an endogenous
choice. Thus, uncontrolled selection, if correlated with age, may be responsible for the
failure to find evidence of rebalancing in the risky share. Third, evidence so far is based
primarily on household surveys which are notoriously subject to measurement problems.
Most importantly, measurement and reporting errors are likely to be correlated with age,
hiding age patterns when present in the true data. For instance, this could arise because
wealth is correlated with age and the wealthy may have a stronger motive to under-report
or not-report specific assets (such as stocks). Hence, age profiles of the risky portfolio
share (and participation) may appear flatter than they actually are.
One important exception is Ameriks and Zeldes (2002) who try to circumvent these
problems by using a panel of TIAA-CREF contributors covering 13 years of data.1 Thus,
they can in principle distinguish between age, time and cohort effects. Because they
use administrative data, non-reporting and under-reporting of assets in the program is
not a major issue. Using a variety of identifying assumptions to separate age, time and
cohort effects and distinguishing between ownership of stocks and conditional shares, they
conclude that a good characterization of the portfolio life cycle is one where the life-cycle
of stock market participation is hump shaped and the conditional share in stocks shows
little action over the life cycle. Thus, in their view, most of the life cycle portfolio changes
take place on the extensive rather than on the intensive margin.
While their results mark a clear progress in the literature, a number of open issues
related in part to the data remain. First, TIAA-CREF reports only assets contributed to
the program, not the complete portfolios of these individuals. Furthermore, the part left
out is not negligible - retirement assets amount to less than 30% of total household financial
assets in the 1998 SCF - and there is no obvious reason why the portfolio allocation in
pension savings should be the same as the allocation in other financial assets or follow the
same age profile (indeed it does not, see Guiso and Sodini 2011). Second, the data refer to
individuals and not to households. If the asset allocation is a joint family decision, this may
result in biased estimates. Third, participants at TIAA-CREF belong to a selected group
of the population - typically employees at institutions of higher education - which have
marked different characteristics compared to a representative population sample. Since
the estimated portfolio life-cycle reflects the age pattern of portfolio-relevant household
(or individual) variables, such as the age profile of human capital and that of its riskiness,
if these profiles differ across groups also the profiles of their portfolios will be different.
Hence, they may not be a good characterization of the average investor in a population.
Finally, dynamic portfolio patterns of pension assets from a defined contribution plan such
1Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunde´n (2003) also use a four year panel dataset of about 7,000 people in a 401k
retirement accounts and can thus distinguish age and time effects. They find that the risky portfolio share
is decreasing in age. However, this result is obtained restricting cohort effects to zero; in addition, since
they fit a Tobit model, no distinction is made between the optimal share and the participation decision.
Thus it is unclear whether the age pattern stems from people exiting the market or lowering their share.
Since they look at allocations in a 401k plan alone, all the issues raised about the Ameriks and Zeldes
(2002) data extend to their data too.
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as TIAA-CREF may be constrained by the rules of the plan, potentially resulting in less
pronounced age patterns than in overall portfolios which reflect allocations of constraint-
free financial wealth.
In this paper, we try to overcome these problems. We have assembled a new database
drawing on administrative records from the Norwegian Tax Registry (NTR). Because
Norwegian households are subject to a wealth tax, they have to report to the tax authority
all their asset holdings, real and financial, item by item at the level of the single instrument
as of the end of year. We have drawn a random sample of 20% (about 164,000) of the 1995
population of Norwegian households and then followed these households for 15 years up
until 2009 - the latest year for which we could obtain the data. This dataset reports the
complete portfolio of Norwegian people and is similar in structure and content to the one
used by Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) but spans many more years - an essential
feature when studying the life cycle profile of portfolio allocation. Being of administrative
source, measurement error is minimized. The main cause of non-reporting or under-
reporting should stem from incentives to evade the wealth tax, but the way the wealth
tax is collected in Norway, as we argue in Section 3, suggests that tax evasion is unlikely
to be an issue. Finally, since the whole population of Norwegian taxpayers has to report
to the NTR, there is little attrition in the panel - apart from that due to death, migration
to another country or divorce.
Taking into account the endogeneity of the participation decision and modelling cohort
effects directly, we find that both participation in the stock market and the portfolio share
in stocks show important life cycle patterns. As in other studies, we also find a hump-
shaped life cycle profile in participation (besides limited stock market participation at all
ages). But we also find that conditional shares decline significantly with investors’ age.
Specifically, the portfolio share in risky assets is high and fairly constant in the earlier
and mid phases of the life cycle at a level just below 50%. As retirement comes into sight,
households start rebalancing their risky asset share gradually but continuously at a pace
of little less than one percentage point per year until they retire (around age 65). In
retirement investors who remain in the stock market keep the share fairly flat at around
30%. On the other hand, participation in the stock market rises rapidly with age when
young, reaching a value of around 60% at age 45 and stays roughly constant or slightly
increasing until retirement. As soon as investors leave the labor market and retire, they
start exiting the stock market as well.
Our data suggest a double adjustment as people age with a very specific timing: a
rebalancing of the portfolio away from stocks before households reach retirement; exiting
the stock market after retirement. Existing calibrated life cycle models can account for the
first behaviour but not the second. We show that extending the models of Gomes, Kot-
likoff, and Viceira (2008) and Gomes and Michaelides (2003) to incorporate a (relatively
large) per period participation cost generates substantial limited participation among the
young but not enough exit after retirement. However, adding also a small subjective prob-
ability of a large loss when investing in stocks (a ”disaster” event), the model predicts a
joint pattern and level of participation and the risky asset share over the life cycle similar
to the one observed in the data, with early rebalancing of the share and pronounced exit
from the risky asset market after retirement.
Numerical simulations reveal that a combination of small participation costs, small
probability of a large loss and a relatively large risk aversion can explain well the shape
and location of the life cycle profile of stock market participation and the risky asset share
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of the average household.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the life cycle portfolio
literature highlighting its core implications for the life cycle pattern of the participation
and risky portfolio share. Section 3 discusses the Norwegian Registry data and presents
descriptive evidence of the portfolio life cycle pattern. Section 4 lays down the methodology
for estimating the life cycle portfolio profile and presents the estimation results. Section
5 shows how an extended calibrated life cycle model can account for the pattern of the
portfolio that we observe in the data. Section 6 presents the results of the calibration and
of estimates of the parameters of the models. Section 7 summarizes our contribution and
draws implications for future research.
2 An overview of the literature
Over the past decade several papers have provided new models of optimal portfolio rebal-
ancing over the life cycle that go beyond the seminal dynamic framework of Merton (1969),
Mossin (1968) and Samuelson (1969). The Merton-Mossin-Samuelson (MMS) models gen-
erate two sharp predictions. First, individuals should participate in risky asset markets at
all ages. Second, the share invested in the risky assets should not vary over the life cycle.
The implications of the MMS models are in contrast both with the limited participation
that we observe in the data at all ages and with the widespread advice of the financial
industry practitioners to invest substantially in stocks when young and reduce the expo-
sure to the stock market when older. Yet, these earlier contributions were not meant to
provide sharp predictions about realistic features of the data but rather to establish the
benchmark conditions under which a long term investor would choose “myopically”- i.e.
show no life cycle pattern in his investments. As Samuelson (1969) points out, “A lifetime
model reveals that investing for many periods does not itself introduce extra tolerance for
riskiness at early, or any, stages of life”. One needs the MMS assumptions of no labor
income, unpredictable stock returns, constant relative risk aversion and time-separable
preferences to obtain an optimal portfolio risky share that does not vary with age (and
wealth).
In fact, as shown by Merton (1971), adding to the model tradeable human capital in a
complete market setting generates a strong rebalancing motive in the financial risky share.
Since human capital is riskless and tradeable, it plays the same role as a large endowment in
riskless bonds. Hence, it creates a strong incentive to invest in risky securities when human
capital is abundant, that is early in the life cycle, and to rebalance away from stocks as
people get older and their human wealth diminishes. The simple presence of human capital
- an indisputable feature of any realistic model of household portfolio decisions - seems to
be enough to provide a rationale for the practitioners’ advice to rebalance the financial
portfolio away from stocks as people age and is consistent with recent evidence that human
capital drives financial risk-taking positively (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2007).
Merton (1971)’s result is obtained in a complete market setting with tradeable hu-
man capital; this allows him to obtain neat closed-form solutions. A new recent wave of
papers has reconsidered the Merton (1971) model relaxing the assumption of complete
markets and tradeability of human capital (see Gomes and Michaelides 2003, Gomes and
Michaelides 2005, Heaton and Lucas 1997, Gakidis 1998, Michaelides and Haliassos 2002,
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2007, Campbell and Viceira 2001, Viceira 2001, Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout 2005, Davis, Kubler, and Willen 2006, Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne,
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and Goldstein 2007, Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2008). Because markets are incomplete
and labor income is uncertain and non-tradeable, these models do not have closed form
solutions and have to be solved numerically. A representative example of this literature is
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). They develop, solve numerically and simulate a life
cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice which allows for non-tradeable and un-
certain labor income as well as many other features that characterize a typical household
environment such as bequest motives, mortality risk, non-standard preferences, uncertain
retirement income and catastrophic labor income shocks. They calibrate the labor income
process with data from the PSID and compute average consumption and assets allocation
by simulating the model over 10,000 households. A robust prediction of this and all the
other models in this literature is that the portfolio share invested in stocks has a strong
life cycle profile. Thus, Merton (1971)’s rebalancing implication holds true not only when
labor income is tradeable and certain but also when it is non-tradeable and subject to
uninsurable risk.2
Although the prediction that households should rebalance their portfolio as they ap-
proach retirement rests on an uncontroversial fact, namely the decline in human capital as
people age, it has been hard to find it in the data, as we have argued. This is likely to be
the reflection of limitations in the data that we are able to overcome using the Norwegian
dataset; indeed, we find evidence that is consistent with the prediction that households
should rebalance their financial risky portfolio as they approach retirement.
While the shape of the age profile of the portfolio share in stocks predicted by these
models resembles the one we find in the data, there are two important differences between
these models’ predictions and our findings. First, the new models generate much higher
shares in stocks, particularly at the beginning of the life cycle and in the middle ages,
than those seen in the data among the stockholders. Second, they often do not give rise to
limited participation and to exit from the stock market as people age. In particular, our
evidence suggests a double adjustment as people age: as they approach retirement, they
rebalance their portfolio share away from stocks but continue to stay in the market. After
retirement they stop rebalancing but start exiting the market. In other words, before
retirement households adjust along the intensive margin; after retirement they reduce
exposure to financial risk along the extensive margin. Some models have addressed the
issue of limited participation among the young by allowing for a once and for all fixed
cost of participation (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005), or for long run co-integration
between labor income and stock market returns (Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein
2007) or for costly access to the loans market (Davis, Kubler, and Willen 2006). None
of these models, however, can deal with exit from the stock market as people retire.
Hence they cannot explain the hump shape in participation over the life cycle and the
timing of rebalancing in the optimal share and in participation that we observe in the
data. In addition, these models tend to predict a far too high share in stocks among the
stockholders at some point over the life cycle. To better mirror the data, we propose a
2A declining life cycle portfolio profile may be generated also by other features than just the life cycle of
human capital. For instance, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) show that accounting for endogenous
labor supply decisions can induce the young to invest more in stocks because greater labor market flexibility
offers insurance against financial risks. A downward sloping age-portfolio profile can be generated by
departure from CRRA utility (Gollier and Zeckhauser 2002), by life cycle patterns of risk aversion and
background risk, as well as predictability of stock returns (Kandel and Stambaugh 1995, Campbell and
Viceira 1999, Campbell and Viceira 2002). These factors may certainly contribute to induce a rebalancing
motive over the life cycle but none is uncontroversial as the life cycle of human capital.
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simple extension of the Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) model enriched with two
ingredients: a per period participation cost and a small probability of a left-tail event in
stock performance, which can be interpreted either as a perceived probability of being
frauded; a ”trust” friction as in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) or as rare disaster
as in Barro (2006) and Rietz (1988).3 This model is able to generate a hump shaped
pattern of stock market participation that peaks at retirement and declines thereafter.
This pattern is the consequence of the hump-shaped wealth age profile: when young,
wealth is typically increasing and thus gradually more and more consumers will cross the
wealth threshold that makes it worthwhile to incur the per period cost, triggering entry
into the stock market. After retirement, people begin to decumulate assets and at some
age the level of assets left is too low for it to be worth paying the per period cost and
remaining in the market, hence they exit.4 At the same time, the portfolio share invested
in stocks among the stockholders is relatively high and flat at young age, but as people
foresee retirement, they start rebalancing the portfolio. The disaster probability helps
not only to lower the portfolio share in stocks, bringing it close to the one observed in
the data, but, as we will show, to account for the exit from the stock market following
retirememt. When we simulate the model, we find that a combination of low participation
cost, low disaster probability and relatively high risk aversion explains quite well the joint
behaviour of life cycle profile of stock market participation and the conditional share of
the average household.
3 Data
The empirical study of household portfolio allocations over the life cycle has formidable
data requirements. Ideally, one needs data on households’ complete portfolio holdings over
a long time span, free of measurement and reporting errors. The NTR data that we use in
our empirical analysis come very close to meet these requirements. Because households in
Norway are subject to a wealth tax, they are required to report every year their complete
wealth holdings to the tax authority. We merge this information with administrative
records of individual demographic characteristics and information on earnings from the
same source and obtain a unique panel data set spanning the years from 1995 to 2009.
3.1 The Norwegian administrative data
Each year, before taxes are filed in April, employers, banks, brokers, insurance companies
and any other financial intermediary send both to the individual and to the tax authority,
information on the value of the asset owned by the individual and administered by the
3Alan (2012) also studies the life cycle portfolio allocation allowing for participation costs and a disaster
probability and estimates it structurally on US data, using pseudo panel data constructed using various
cross sections of the US Survey of Consumer Finances. She finds that the model fits the data poorly. As
she notices when compares the simulated profile and that in the data, ”What is particularly disturbing in
this figure is that the model persistently generates a hump shape for shares and participation that does
not exist in the data.” However, it may be that it is not the model that needs to be amended but rather
the data that are unable, due to the shortcomings of survey data discussed in the introduction, to reveal
the true life cycle portfolio pattern.
4Some exit from the stock market after retirement may occur even without a per period participation
cost if households liquidate stocks in bulk to finance durable consumption purchases or to face unusual
lumpy expenses e.g. for health care (Alan 2006). In general, however, absent participation costs, one
should see a decumulation of both stocks and bonds and very little exit.
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employer or the intermediary, as well as information on the income earned on these assets.
In case an individual holds no stocks, the tax authority pre-fills a tax form and sends it to
the individual for approval; if the individual does not respond, the tax authority considers
the information it has gathered as approved. In 2009, as many as 2 million individuals in
Norway (60% of the tax payers) belonged to this category.5 If the individual owns stocks
then he has to fill in the tax statement - including calculations of capital gains/losses
and deduction claims. The statement is sent back to the tax authority which, as in the
previous case receives all the basic information from employers and intermediaries and can
thus check its truthfulness and correctness.6 Stockholders are treated differently because
the government wants to save on the time necessary to fill in more complex tax statements
and to reduce the risk of litigation due to miscalculated deductions on capital losses and
taxes on capital gains.7 This procedure, particularly the fact that financial institutions
supply information on their customer’s financial assets directly to the tax authority, makes
tax evasion very difficult, and thus non-reporting or under-reporting of assets holdings very
likely to be negligible.8
Tax statements on both labor income in the previous year and asset holdings, as of
December 31 of the previous year, are filed separately by each taxpayer in the population
even for married couples. Besides information on assets, the administrative data contains
information on demographic characteristics of all individuals as well as an identifier for
the family they belong to. Thus, we can aggregate assets at the household level. For our
purposes, we define a household as a married couple (or a cohabiting couple possibly with
children) and identify its age (and other characteristics such as education) with that of the
husband. The term ”cohort” refers to the year of birth of the husband. In order to extract
a large but still computationally manageable sample, we first retain all households defined
as above with both spouses alive as of 1995 and with at least 3,000 NOK of financial assets
(480 USD at 1995 prices). We then randomly sample 20 percent of them obtaining an
initial reference sample of 164,015 households which we follow over the subsequent 15 years
until 2009. Households who exit the sample because individuals die, or migrate or divorce
are not replaced. Overall, the sample contains 916,823 household-year observations.9
We focus on the financial portfolio and distinguish between bank deposits, bonds,
stocks (of listed and non-listed companies), mutual funds and money market funds.10
Following the literature, we consider a two asset-portfolio and define risky financial assets
as the sum of mutual funds with a stock component and directly held stocks; the rest - the
sum of bank deposits, money market funds and bonds - is classified as risk-free assets.11
5See Norwegian Tax Administration annual report:
http://www.skatteetaten.no/Upload/annual-report-2009.pdf
6Internet brokers tend to offer to their costumers calculations of realized returns over the previous year
for free.
7Since year 2000 all this is done electronically; prior to 2000 tax reports were done on paper forms.
8The only exception is if households own and do not report foreign investments. Calvet, Campbell, and
Sodini (2007) discuss this issue for Sweden and conclude that unreported foreign investments represent a
modest fraction of households’ assets - except perhaps for the very wealthy.
9The quality of this data is similar to that in the Swedish data studied by Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini
(2007). Until 2007, Sweden like Norway collected taxes on both individual income and wealth. In 2007,
however, Sweden abandoned the wealth tax, leaving Norway as the only Scandinavian country with this
arrangement.
10Very few households (67 observations in the whole sample) hold more sophisticated instruments such
as futures and options. We exclude them from the sample.
11Private old age pensions were not widespread in Norway during our observation window. All Norwegian
citizens are entitled to a state pension from the age of 67 in accordance with the National Insurance Act.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics - 1995
Full Sample Balanced Panel Sample
Obs Mean Std Dev Median Obs Mean Std Dev Median
Demographics:
Age Husband 164,015 50.88 14.14 49 106,369 47.67 11.64 47
Age Wife 164,015 48.12 14.01 47 106,369 45.00 11.40 45
Share Less High School Education 164,015 0.22 106,369 0.18
Share High School Education 164,015 0.53 106,369 0.55
Share College Education 164,015 0.24 106,369 0.27
Household Size 164,015 3.24 1.19 3 106,369 3.44 1.17 3
Asset Holdings in USD:
Financial Wealth 164,015 38,270 106,975 11,884 106,369 38,169 111,865 11,348
Stocks 164,015 12,797 91,438 0 106,369 14,386 97,230 0
Mutual Funds 164,015 1,173 3,895 0 106,369 1,245 3,989 0
Safe Assets 164,015 24,297 37,678 9,734 106,369 22,536 35,575 9,139
Net worth 164,015 120,354 143,051 97,543 106,369 116,213 142,199 93,318
Participant share:
Risky Assets 164,015 0.33 0.47 0 106,369 0.35 0.48 0
Stocks 164,015 0.23 0.42 0 106,369 0.25 0.43 0
Mutual Funds 164,015 0.22 0.41 0 106,369 0.23 0.42 0
Mean share participants:
Risky Assets 54,519 0.32 0.30 0.20 37,770 0.33 0.31 0.22
Stocks 54,519 0.23 0.31 0.05 37,770 0.24 0.32 0.06
Mutual Funds 54,519 0.09 0.15 0.03 37,770 0.09 0.15 0.04
Attrition: 58,863
Share Death 0.62
Share Migration 0.13
Share Divorce/Separation 0.25
Mean yearly attrition rate: 0.030 0.000
Age at Exit 62.63 16.83
Note: This table displays summary statistics for the main sample of married households in the first year of observation, 1995. In addition,
the table provides summary statistics for the sample of households that remain in the panel throughout, until 2009. Where applicable, values
are reported in 1995 USD. Education is missing for less than one percent of the sample.
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Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the whole household sample in 1995. House-
hold average age is 51 years. High school diploma is the most common educational level,
which is attained by 53% of the sample, while 26% hold a college degree. The average
Norwegian household holds around 38,000 USD (1995 prices) in financial assets. Net
worth, the sum of financial assets and real estate net of debt, amounts to 120,000 USD, of
which about 2/3 is real estate.12 The financial portfolio of the average household is mostly
composed of safe assets which account for 63% of average financial assets. We define a par-
ticipant in the risky financial assets market to be a household with at least 160 USD (1995
prices) of risky assets. The participation rate in risky asset markets amounts to 33% (37%
if we include all those with positive risky assets), reflecting 23% of the population holding
stocks directly and 22% percent participating via mutual funds. Thus, back in 1995 mu-
tual funds were not as widespread as direct stock-holding among Norwegian households.
Among participants, the average portfolio share in risky assets is 32% while mutual funds
account for 9%; a similar figure for the total share prevails in other European countries,
as documented in Haliassos, Guiso, and Jappelli (2001). Needless to say, over our sample
period, asset markets worldwide and in Norway experienced both booms and busts and
the mutual fund industry expanded significantly making it easier for many households to
participate in the risky asset market, e.g. by lowering participation costs, offering more
diversified investments and spreading information about mutual fund investments.
Although there is attrition in the sample at an average annual rate of 3%, we can track
2/3 of the households sampled in 1995 all the way until 2009. The main reason for exiting
the sample is death of one spouse (62%), which is consistent with the high average age
at exit (65 years, see bottom of Table 3.1). To get a sense of the importance of attrition
for the composition of the sample, the right part of Table 3.1 displays summary statistics
in 1995 for the balanced sample - households that are present continuously from 1995 to
2009. Balanced panel households are not surprisingly younger in 1995 and slightly better
educated. However, the value of asset holdings, portfolio allocation and risky asset market
participation are similar across the two groups suggesting that attrition is fairly random.
3.2 Portfolio life cycle patterns by cohort: descriptive evidence
Figure 3.1 plots the age participation profile in the risky assets market for selected cohorts
spaced by 5-year intervals, beginning with the cohort born in 1970, aged 25 in 1995, the
first sample year. Since we are able to follow each cohort for 15 years, just plotting the
raw data provides a good picture of the life cycle portfolio pattern.
Consider the first cohort born in 1970 whose members are 25 years old in 1995; only
slightly more than 10% of them were participating in risky asset markets in 1995. However,
subsequently the share of participants in this cohort increases substantially, and five years
later when this cohort ages 30, almost 50% of the households own risky financial assets.
Clearly, this pattern is consistent with a marked age effect (an increase in participation
The financing of this system is through a Pay-as-you-go system, but it is currently undergoing reforms
and evolving towards a defined contribution system to be fully implemented by 2025. Furthermore, early
retirement schemes are widespread in Norway and workers may be eligible for these from the age of 62, see
e.g. Vestad (2013). Pension benefits are indexed according to the average wage growth of the population.
12The value of real estate is a proxy based on the reported tax values of Norwegian households, and is
not updated every year. To obtain our estimate, we divide the reported tax value of real estate by 0.25.
This follows the guidelines of the Norwegian Tax Authorities, which state that the tax value of real estate
shall not exceed 30% of its market value.
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Figure 3.1: Participation shares in Risky Asset markets, selected cohorts
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Note: This Figure plots the mean participation rates in Risky Asset markets at observed age for selected
cohorts in the period 1995-2009.
with age), with strong time effects (an increase in participation due to favourable improve-
ments in market conditions, e.g. the boom of the mutual funds industry), as well as with
a cohort-specific pattern. If this were the only cohort observed, these effects would be
hard to disentangle as time and age evolve in parallel and we only observe one cohort. We
could not make any claim on whether the increase in participation rate is cohort-specific,
a pure age effect, or if it reflects a common time trend that affects all cohorts in the years
1995-2009.
The next plotted cohort - households born in 1965 - reveals a steep increase in average
participation during the first years of our sample also for these households. This suggests
that the increase in participation over age/time is unlikely to be cohort specific. But it
is still unclear whether it is due to an age-effect, or to a common time trend. Comparing
the evolution of participation across cohorts suggests that time effects are likely to be
important; for instance, all cohorts experience a marked increase in participation during
the first years of our sample, even those born in 1920 - who are 75 in 1995 - and thus
typically exit risky asset markets. And a drop during the 2001 recession even among those
born in the 1960’s and 1970’s who are typically entering the stock market. This graphical
evidence also suggests that cohort effects are likely to play an important role. In fact,
compared to younger cohorts, older cohorts at the same age, have lower participation
13
Table 3.2: Entry and Exit Definitions
Measure 1:
Entry: The fraction of households who do not hold stocks at age a that enter
the risky asset markets at a+1.
Exit: The fraction of those who are stockholders at age a who exit the market
at age a+1.
Measure 2:
Entry: The fraction of households who has never held any stocks up until
the age a that enter the risky asset markets at a+1.
Exit: The fraction of those who are stockholders at age a who exit the market
at age a+1 and never re-enters the stock market.
Figure 3.2: Entry and Exit rates from Risky Asset Markets
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Note: This Figure plots entry and exit rates into the risky asset markets. The left graph depicts entry and
exit frequencies, allowing for re-entry/exits. In the right graph, frequencies of first time entry and once
and for all exits are plotted.
rates. In Section 4, we describe our empirical strategy to separate age and time effects
and test for the presence of cohort effects.
As a next step in the descriptive analysis of the life cycle patterns of participation,
we consider two measures of entry into and exit from the stock market, as defined in
Table 3.2. These two measures are plotted in Figure 3.2 for the same selected cohorts.
The first measure refers to entry (exit) in a given year, regardless of the household’s past
(future) participation pattern. The second, reports entry (exit) that was not preceded
(followed) by a previous entry (a subsequent exit). The second measure captures first-
time entry and permanent exit.
First-time entry is very high at the beginning of the life cycle, with a peak at 13%,
and drops steadily thereafter. It is lower than total entry particularly for middle aged
households. Instead permanent exit is low at the beginning of the life cycle and increases
sharply after retirement.13 By comparing the two measures, Figure 3.2 highlights that
13Because of the limited time span of our data, the second measure of entry and exit may be affected
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early in life temporary entry and exit are very common phenomena. Among households
in their early 30’s, 13% enter the stock market and most of them enter for the first time.
On the other hand, the fraction of young households that sells all risky financial assets
to return to the stock market later in life is almost five times the fraction of households
that exit permanently. The existence of intermittent participation suggests a role for per
period participation cost and it will be interesting to see whether our extended model that
allows for this type of costs can reproduce the observed pattern of entry and exit.14
Figure 3.3 plots the risky financial share among households who participate in the
stock market for the same cohorts as in Figure 3.1. We refer to it as the conditional
share. Looking at the overall age pattern the picture suggests that once people enter,
they invest a relatively large share in risky assets, hold it fairly constant over the early
part of the life cycle and reduce it as they age. A comparison across cohorts suggests less
pronounced cohort effects than those that seem to characterize the participation profile.
On the other hand, the pattern of the conditional share over time across cohorts reveals
strong time effects, reflecting movements in stock prices that are only partially undone by
active rebalancing, as suggested by Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009). Instead, the raw
data for the risky share suggest that there is substantial rebalancing over the life cycle, in
particular as households approach retirement.
4 Estimation
The descriptive evidence suggests the existence of marked life cycle patterns for both the
participation decision and the risky share of household’s portfolio conditional on partici-
pation. However, it does not deal with two key issues: the endogeneity of participation in
risky assets and the separation of time, age and cohort effects. In this section, we discuss
how we address these issues in order to pin down the age profile of participation in the
market for risky asset markets and the portfolio share for the participants.
4.1 Methodology: limited asset market participation
It is well established that not all households participate in risky asset markets. Empirical
studies of the life cycle profile of household portfolios has, so far, neglected the endogeneity
of participation when estimating the life cycle profile of the portfolio share (Ameriks and
Zeldes 2002). This is unfortunate because unaccounted selection can bias the relation
between the optimal share and age, for instance hiding it. Also calibrated life cycle models
have, until recently, ignored limited participation in risky asset markets by abstracting
from participation costs. Later, we will remedy this deficiency by introducing a per period
participation cost in a standard life cycle portfolio model that already allows for several
other realistic features.
Empirically, we deal with the joint decision of whether to participate and how much
financial wealth to allocate in risky assets using a Heckman selection model. To do so, we
by censoring. Censoring should bias upward both the first time entry rate measure at young age, and the
permanent exit rate measure at old age.
14Note that at low and high ages, the number of observations is limited because of fewer households and
because of more limited stock market participation at extreme ages. This explains the higher variability
at the two ends of the age range both in this Figure 3.2 and in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Risky Share of Financial Wealth by Cohort
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Note: This Figure plots the average risky shares of households’ financial portfolios conditional on partici-
pation, for selected cohorts at each age they are observed.
estimate a probit model for the household participation in the risky assets market and a
share equation for the participants accounting for selection. To achieve identification, we
let the decision to participate be affected by (the lagged value of) the overall lifetime wealth
of the individual, obtained summing accumulated assets and an estimate of the individual
stock of human wealth (see the Appendix in Section A.2 for details about the estimation
of human wealth), and impose that lifetime wealth does not affect the financial portfolio
share conditional on participation. This exclusion restriction is inspired by Merton (1971)
whose model implies that in the presence of labor income, risky assets holdings as a share
of total lifetime wealth is constant over the life cycle and thus independent of lifetime
wealth. The financial portfolio share in risky assets depends on the ratio of human to
financial wealth which evolves over the life cycle but not on the level of lifetime wealth.
Hence, controlling for age to account for the life cycle of human to financial wealth, the
16
share should be unaffected by total lifetime resources.15 We impose this restriction.16 Of
course, with a fixed participation cost the decision to participate will depend on the level
of individual wealth (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002).
4.2 Methodology: treatment of cohort effects
Even though we observe households’ investments over a substantial portion of their life
span, it is well known that it is not possible, without additional restrictions, to identify
cohort, time and age effects. This issue is extensively discussed in Ameriks and Zeldes
(2002) in the context of estimates of the life cycle profile of portfolio choice. In fact,
calendar time, age and year of birth are linearly related. Hence, if we observe that older
people hold fewer stocks than younger ones, it may be because as they age they choose
a safer portfolio (an age effect) or it may be because the older grew up in different times
than the younger and this has led to develop different preferences towards risk or different
beliefs about stock market returns (a cohort effect). Alternatively, it could be that over the
years people are exposed to different types of shocks (a time effect). Panel data partially
addresses this issue, but as much as they help identifying one extra dimension, they also
add one more dimension to identify.
Since at the heart of the identification problem is the linear relationship ”calendar
year”=”age” + ”year of birth”, most solutions have proceeded by making assumptions or
using prior information so as to break this multicollinearity, allowing the use of standard
regression techniques. One strategy that has been followed is to re-specify the model to
make it non-linear or to estimate it in first differences; another is to impose parametric
restrictions; a third to replace the dummies that capture one of the effects with variables
meant to capture a causal mechanism for that effect.17 Here we rely on both the second
15Let s(a) denote the share of financial wealth (W (a)) invested in risky assets by an individual aged a
and H(a) his stock of human capital. In Merton (1971) the share of risky assets as a fraction of lifetime
wealth W (a) +H(a) is
s(a)W (a)
W (a)+H(a)
=
rp
γσ2r
where rp denotes the equity premium, σ
2
r the variance of stock returns and γ the investor relative risk
aversion. This share is constant over age; on the other hand, s(a) =
rp
γσ2r
(1 + H(a)
W (a)
) and varies over the life
cycle because the ration of human capital to financial wealth H(a)
W (a)
varies with age. Thus, capturing H(a)
W (a)
with a set of age dummies, s(a) is unaffected by the level of human wealth or that of financial wealth.
16The restriction holds true in the context of the Merton (1971) model; whether it is still valid once one
relaxes the assumption on which it builds, in particular the complete market markets assumption, is hard
to tell because there is no closed form solution to the model. One may think that with uninsurable income
risk, presumably investors with more cash on hand can stand background risk more easily, suggesting that
cash on hand can reduce the effect of background risk on the risky portfolio share, which would invalidate
the exclusion restriction. To check how important this may be, we have used the simulated data generated
by the model in Section 5 and run regressions of the portfolio share on a full set of time dummies and cash
on hand accounting for endogenous participation. We find that cash on hand has positive and strong effect
on participation (one standard deviation increase in cash on hand increases the probability of participation
in the stock market by 10 percentage points - about 25% the mean participation rate. On the other hand it
has a negative but very small effect on the share. A one standard deviation increase in cash on hand lowers
the risky share by 1.6 percentage points. Since its mean is around 40%, this is a tiny effect. Thus, though
the exclusion restriction does not hold literally, it seems to hold approximately. An alternative exclusion
restriction that is implied by the theory would be to use information on per period participation costs in
the probit regression. Finding valid measures of individual participation costs is very difficult and we have
not, so far, been able to come up with a convincing one. Thus, rather then trying unconvincing proxies
for participation costs, we have preferred to impose an identifying restriction that simulations suggest is,
economically speaking, not far from what literal validity requires.
17The use of one or another strategy is context specific and the choice depends on what assumption
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(impose parametric restrictions) and the third strategy (model cohort effects explicitly).
As for the parametric restrictions, we rely on Deaton and Paxson (1994) and impose
that time effects sum to zero once the variables have been detrended. Since our data
cover several years, we should be able to separate trend and cycle, and thus be reasonably
confident about the decomposition of age, time and cohort effect based on this restriction
(Deaton 1997).
To implement the other strategy, we build on recent research by Giuliano and Spilim-
bergo (2009), which indicates that generations who grew up in recessions have systemat-
ically different socio-economic beliefs compared to generations who grew up in booms -
suggesting important year of birth effects on beliefs preferences. Even closer to the spirit
of our approach is the study by Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who show that households
with experience of higher stock market returns early in life are more likely to participate
in the stock market and, conditional on participation, invest a higher fraction of their
wealth in risky assets. Furthermore, when asked, they report a higher willingness to bear
risk, possibly because early experiences have enduring effects on risk preferences. This ev-
idence suggests that one can rely on variations in experienced stock market returns among
members of our sample to model cohort effects. Accordingly, we will use stock market
returns (a weighted average of the Norwegian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the S&P 500
index) experienced during the household heads’ youth (between age 18 and age 25, as in
Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009) as our proxy for cohort effects. As we will show, these
returns significantly affect the decision to enter the risky assets market and to a lesser
extent the conditional risky share. Thereby we can identify unrestricted time and age
effects. However, we try to validate this second strategy by imposing a restriction on the
age profile and estimate unrestricted cohort effects; then, we test whether the unrestricted
cohort effects correlate with early age stock market experiences. In doing so, we follow
Berndt and Griliches (1995) who solve the identification problem by restricting some of
the age coefficients identical.
To assess the robustness of our results, we also follow a third approach imposing some
restrictions on the age profiles and thereby allowing for unrestricted time and cohort
effects. As we show in Section 5, our simulated model generates a hump shaped profile for
the risky portfolio share and participation. Around the peak, the profile changes smoothly
and tends to be relatively flat. Hence, a theory-based, reasonable restriction is to impose
that the age effects are constant around the peak. We use the simulations in Figure 6.3
to identify the peak in the participation profile (age 60) and in the conditional share (age
38) and then we impose that age effects be the same two years before and two years after
the peak.
4.3 Model specification
We specify the following two equation model for the share of financial wealth invested
in stocks conditional on participation, siact, and for the decision to participate Piact by
appears reasonable in the specific context. Some recent papers propose generic, contest-independent solu-
tions. One is suggested by Yang, Fu, and Land (2004) and Yang, SchulhoferWohl, Fu, and Land (2008)
who propose what they call the intrinsic estimator. Another introduced by Browning, Crawford, and
Knoef (2012) who show that when the range of the variable(s) of interest is bounded, the time, age and
cohort effects are partially identified in the sense they are confined to a closed convex set. They then
propose using a maximum entropy estimator to achieve point identification within that set. Because our
variables are bounded (the decisions to participate being zero/one, and the share between 0 and 1) the
later methodology could be applied in our context.
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household i, aged a, belonging to cohort c in year t:
siact = βaAa + βcCc + βtDt + β0Trend+ θ1Ziact + θ2λiact + εiact (4.1)
prob(Piact = 1|x) = prob(P ?iact > 0|x)
= prob(δaAa + δcCc + δtDt + δ0Trend+ ϑ1Ziact + ϑ2Liact + ηiact > 0)
where Piact is a dummy variable taking value 1 for households with positive risky
assets and zero otherwise, P ∗iact is the unobserved latent variable triggering participation
when positive, Aa, Cc and Dt denote dummies for age, cohort and time, Trend is a time
trend, Ziact a vector of individual controls, λiact the inverse Mills ratio computed from the
participation equation and Liact an estimate of lifetime wealth; εiact and ηiact are error
terms.
When we use the Deaton and Paxson (1994) method to tell age, time and cohort effects
apart, we also impose the restriction
∑
βt =
∑
δt = 0; when we model cohort effects as a
function of experienced stock market returns (Riact), we set Cc = Riact and β0 = δ0 = 0.
Finally, identification through peak restrictions are obtained imposing β36 = β37 = β38 =
β39 = β40 in the share equation and δ50 = δ59 = δ60 = δ61 = δ62 in the participation
equation and β0 = δ0 = 0. Assuming ηiact is normally distributed, we estimate the above
model using a two stage Heckman estimator.
4.4 Results from estimating life cycle patterns
Table 4.1 reports the estimates of the Heckman selection model. Age and time effects as
well as the coefficients of the other controls are, for brevity, not reported. The first two
columns show the estimates using the Deaton and Paxson (1994) restriction. In the first
column, the time trend is positive, significant and economically important in the partici-
pation equation; it implies that in the final year of the sample the average participation
rate is 18 percentage point higher than at the beginning of the sample. The trend is nega-
tive and statistically significant but economically small in the conditional share estimate.
Unrestricted cohort effects are significant both for the participation decision and for the
risky asset share, but particularly for the former (see the χ2 test at the bottom of the Ta-
ble). Interestingly, the probability that the household participates in the market for risky
assets is strongly affected by the level of lifetime wealth, which suggests that the identify-
ing strategy is, as expected, both consistent with the presence of fixed participation costs
and powerful. In addition, the significance of the Mills ratio suggests the importance of
adjusting for selection to obtain consistent estimates of the age profile of the conditional
share.
Column 3 and 4 show the estimates obtained modelling cohort effects explicitly. Co-
hort effects captured by stock market returns experienced in youth have a positive and
significant effect on the participation decision but not on the share of financial wealth
invested in risky assets among the participants. Economically, investors who grow up in
years of low stock market returns (5th percentile of the historical return distribution) are
6.12 percentage points less likely to own risky assets compared to investors exposed in
youth to high stock market returns (95th percentile of the historical return distribution).
The effect of lifetime wealth on participation and of the Mills ratio on the conditional
share is essentially the same as when imposing the Deaton and Paxson (1994) restriction.
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Finally, the last two columns report the results imposing peak restrictions. Again, the
effects of initial total wealth in the participation regression and the Mills ratio is similar to
the estimates obtained using the other two methods. Most importantly, if we retrieve the
cohort effects from these estimates and correlate them with the youth stock returns proxy,
we find that they are positively correlated, in particular, cohort effects in the participation
regression which supports the identification strategy used in Columns 3 and 4.
The age profile for participation and the portfolio share obtained from the estimated
Heckman model using the first two strategies are plotted in the two panels of Figure 4.1.18
Independently of the method used to separate age from time and cohort effects, the figures
document a distinct hump-shaped age pattern of asset market participation over the life
cycle. Among younger households, the participation rate (right scale) increases steadily
until the age of approximately 40, and then much more gradually, peaking when households
are in their 60’s, just prior to retirement. At peak the participation rate is around 60%.
From then on participation in the risky asset market drops almost linearly until the age of
80. The age pattern of the conditional risky share is remarkably different. The share starts
high at very young age and remains relatively constant for about a decade; from then on
individuals rebalance the share in risky assets first gradually and then somewhat faster
until retirement (around age 65), when the risky share stabilizes. During the transition,
the share is reduced at a speed of around half of a percentage point a year (if the cohort
proxy is used or 2/3 of a percentage point using the Deaton and Paxson (1994) restriction),
half of the speed of adjustment that is typically recommended by practitioners.
The most interesting feature of the two profiles is the timing of the portfolio adjust-
ment along the two margins - the intensive margin of the share invested in risky financial
assets and the extensive margin of participation in risky assets. Our estimates show that
consistent with life cycle portfolio models with labor income, households do limit exposure
to the stock market by rebalancing their financial portfolio as they approach retirement
and the stock of human capital falls. But they adjust also along the other margin, by
leaving the stock market altogether as they age. However, this adjustment starts to take
place only after the household retires, exactly when the adjustment along the intensive
margin stops. The pattern and the timing of this double adjustment that we document
empirically is the focus of the life cycle portfolio model developed in Section 5.
Figure 4.2 contrasts the estimated life cycle profiles of the share and participation
considering also the peak restriction method. The three methods deliver very similar par-
ticipation profiles. Instead, the Deaton and Paxson (1994) method predicts a significantly
higher conditional particularly among the young.
Since the age profiles of human capital differ in level and shape according to edu-
cation (see Appendix A.2), these differences may result in different portfolio share and
participation profiles though their main qualitative features should be preserved since
human wealth declines with age independently of education. As a robustness check, we
have estimated the model presented in Section 4.3 separately for three education groups
imposing the Deaton and Paxson (1994) restriction (results are similar using the other
two methods). More educated households tend to participate more and to invest larger
shares in risky assets conditional on participation. However, the age profile of the share
and participation preserve the dual adjustment pattern that we have documented for the
whole sample, with the conditional share being relatively flat in the middle ages and then
18Obviously, since the value of lifetime wealth depends on age it contributes to confer a lifetime profile
to the participation rate, in addition to the effect that the age dummies have on it. Figure 4.1 reflects this.
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declining until retirement and the participation profile being hump shaped with exit from
the stock market beginning only after households have already adjusted the share and are
close to retire or just retired.
Finally, we apply the same methodology to separate age from year and cohort effects
in the entry and exit patterns shown in Figure 3.2. We regress the two different measures
of entry and exit of the risky asset market on age dummies, cohort dummies and calendar
year fixed effects imposing the Deaton-Paxson restriction discussed in 4.2. The estimated
profiles are reported in Figure 4.3. Interestingly, once we account for cohort and time
effects, the entry age profiles are hump shaped with a peak around age 40 while the exit
age profiles are somewhat U-shaped.
Table 4.1: Heckman Selection Model
Deaton-Paxson Cohort Proxy Peak Restriction
Part Eq RS Eq Part Eq RS Eq Part Eq RS Eq
Trend 0.012*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Youth Stock Return 0.361*** -0.070
(0.017) (0.080)
Lag Total Wealth 4.107*** 4.186*** 3.597***
(0.148) (0.030) (0.010)
λiact -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.185***
(0.001) (0,001) (0.001)
Observations 1,804,115 886,189 1,804,115 886,189 1,804,115 886,189
Joint sign. tests
Year χ2 (12) 1575.79*** 882.70***
Cohort χ2 (59) 7644.51*** 19.17*** 1641.10*** 9.99***
Note: This table displays the three estimated Heckman selection models (discussed in Section 4.2) for asset market
participation and the conditional risky share. Lagged Total Wealth is the sum of Financial and Human Wealth and
is in 100.000 USD (1995), and ”lambda” is the inverse Mills ratio/nonselection hazard. Coefficients in the Selection
Equation are calculated marginal effects of the underlying probit regression. For spacial reasons calendar year fixed
effects and family size coefficients are not reported here, age coefficients and marginal effects are displayed in Figure
4.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
5 Model
The previous sections have established novel stylized facts about the life cycle profile of
Norwegian households’ asset market participation and portfolio composition. Existing
calibrated life cycle models can account for the rebalancing of the risky share away from
stocks over the life cycle, but not for the joint patterns of adjustment of the share and
the participation in the risky assets market. In this section, we present a life cycle model
that can account for the life cycle profile of portfolio allocations along both margins. To
facilitate comparisons with the literature, we use the workhorse portfolio choice model of
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) but add two features. First, we allow for a fixed per-
period stock market participation cost; this provides a motive for exiting the stock market
as people age besides inducing limited participation in the stock market at early ages.
Second, we allow for a small probability of a negative tail event when investing in stocks.
There are two well established ways in the literature to interpret this tail event. One
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Figure 4.1: Estimation: Risky Asset Market Participation & Risky Shares
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Note: The left panel of the Figure plots the life cycle patterns for both the risky asset market participation
and the conditional risky share of financial wealth coming from the Heckman selection equation applying the
Deaton and Paxson (1994) methodology reported in columns 1)-2) in Table 4.1. The right panel applying
the cohort-proxy methodology reported in columns 3)-4) in Table 4.1. For the Selection/Participation
Equation, we plot the marginal values of the estimated underlying probit equation, and for the risky share,
the age coefficients of the Outcome equation in the Heckman model.
Figure 4.2: Estimation: Comparing methodologies
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Note: The left panel of the Figure plots the life cycle patterns of Risky Asset Market Participation coming
from the Heckman selection equations reported in Table 4.1 applying the three different methodologies,
Deaton-Paxson, cohort-proxy and peak restriction. The participation graphs plot the marginal values of
the estimated underlying probit equations. The right panel plots the life cycle patterns of Conditional Risky
Share of financial wealth coming from the Heckman selection equations reported in Table 4.1 applying the
three different methodologies: Deaton-Paxson, Cohort-Proxy and Peak Restriction.
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Figure 4.3: Life Cycle Patterns of Entry and Exit from Risky Asset Markets
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Note: These figures plot the estimated life cycle patterns of entry to and exit from risky asset markets,
defined by two different measures in Table 3.2 imposing the Deaton-Paxson restriction of zero-sum time
effects (see Section 4.2).
interpretation is that stocks are (more than other financial instruments) subject to frauds
and investors receive less than full legal protection giving rise to limited trust as in Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).19 An alternative interpretation, pursued by Barro (2006)
and Rietz (1988) argues that households anticipate rare disasters of the type considered.
As we will see, this second feature is key for the model to generate enough exit from the
stock market after retirement as well as to help addressing the “too” high conditional
shares in risky assets at young and middle ages that a workhorse portfolio choice model
typically generates. We proceed with the illustration of the model.
5.1 Households
In the model economy, households work from age T b until age Tw, after which households
retire. Households face uncertainty in the number of years they live (T ). We model
this component as in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and denote pa the probability
that the household is still alive at age a + 1 conditional on being alive at a. We assume
that households leave no intentional bequests and their objective function is the sum of
discounted life time utility:
E
T∑
a=1
δa(
a−2∏
j=0
pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βa
U(ci,a) (5.1)
where ci,a is the consumption of household i at age a and δ the discount factor, and
βa the age-dependent effective discount factor that takes into account the probability of
19In recent years, several claims of accused fraud against the biggest financial adviser firms in Norway
for selling dubious products with high leverage are ongoing. In March 2013 the Norwegian Supreme Court
ruled that DNB (Norway’s biggest commercial bank) would have to compensate a small investor who had
suffered large losses on guaranteed savings products the bank had sold him in 2000. See http://www.
morningstar.com/invest/articles/727984-norways-dnb-compensate-investment-clients.html or
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/24/dnbnor-lawsuit-idUSLO13864720090424
23
death. We assume the utility function is of the CRRA type; the degree of risk aversion is
denoted by γ.
5.2 Market structure
In the model economy, markets are incomplete. Households smooth consumption over the
life cycle by holding a riskless asset and possibly a risky asset. The riskless asset can be
thought of as a real bond and has a time-invariant return rf . We denote the amount of
bonds a household i holds at age a with bi,a. Whereas the riskless asset can be purchased
and sold at no cost, we impose a fixed per-period participation cost q to hold risky assets.
The amount of risky asset held by household i at age a is denoted si,a. The risky asset
has a time-dependent real return r˜t, and a risk premium denoted rp.
r˜t = rf + rp + νt, ν ∼ N (0, σ2r ). (5.2)
where νt is the period t innovation to stock market returns drawn from a normal
distribution. Finally, we assume that households can’t borrow against future labor income
and that the quantities of the two assets held are non-negative.
si,a ≥ 0, bi,a ≥ 0. (5.3)
These constraints ensure that the share αi,a of financial wealth invested in risky assets
at age a, is non-negative and αi,a ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we incorporate a tail risk into the
model reflecting either a subjective belief people have that corporate or mutual fund
managers abscond with their money (as in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008) or a
probability of a ”disaster” as in Barro (2006), Barro (2009) and Rietz (1988) - a rare
event that damages their stock investment. In contrast to Barro (2009) and Rietz (1988),
the disaster is individual specific. Thus, the tail risk can either reflect the probability
a household attributes to being cheated or/and the probability of some extreme loss in
investment value and is taken into account by the household when deciding its portfolio
allocation. We denote with ptail this low probability event that the household faces every
period. The complementary probability (1 − ptail) measures the degree of confidence an
investor has in recovering his investment with the accrued return.
5.3 Household problem
5.3.1 Household budget constraints
Households start a period with a certain amount of cash-on-hand which is the sum of
their labor income (wazi,a) and financial wealth (xi,a). Then households decide how much
to consume (ci,a) and to save in bonds (bi,a+1) if they don’t participate in the stock
market, and how much to consume and save in bonds and equity (si,a+1), if they choose
to participate in the stock market. Finally, they compare their utility in both scenarios
(participation vs. non-participation) and decide whether to enter (stay) or exit the stock
market.
The budget constraint of a working age household reads as follows:
ci,a+1i,a+1(si,a+1+q)+bi,a+1 = wazi,a+(1+ r˜a)1i,asi,a+(1+rf )bi,a, a = 1, ..., T
w (5.4)
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where 1i,a+1 is an indicator function taking value 1 if household i participates in the
stock market at age a+ 1 and 0 if not; wazi,a stands for the age-dependent labor income
which is composed of an age-dependent deterministic component wa and a random walk
component zi,a, as shown in equation (A.1). The labor income components are estimated
from our dataset.20
The retired households’ budget constraint reads as follows:
ci,a+1i,a+1(si,a+1+q)+bi,a+1 = φretwTw +(1+ r˜a)1i,asi,a+(1+rf )bi,a, a = T
w+1, ..., T
(5.5)
Equation (5.5) is isomorphic to (5.4) with the difference that labor income is now time-
invariant: Retirement income is a fixed share φret of the last working-age labor income of
the household.
The household problem is to maximize its objective function given by equation (5.1)
subject to the above constraints (5.2)-(5.5). In the following subsection, we formulate this
problem recursively.
5.3.2 Recursive formulation
The household problem has a set of control variables {ci,a, si,a+1, bi,a+1,1i,a+1}Ta=1 and a
set of state variables {xi,a, zi,a}Ta=1. We denote V ina (x, z) the indirect utility of a a-year
old household who participates in the stock market, has labor productivity z and financial
wealth amounting to x,21, and is the solution to the following maximization problem:
V ina (x, z) = max
c,s′,b′
U(c) +βa+1Ez′,r˜′
[
(1− ptail)Va+1(x′, z′) + ptailVa+1((1 + rf )b′, z′)
]
(5.6)
where
x′ = (1 + rf )b′ + (1 + r˜)s′. (5.7)
Households participating in the stock market have with probability (1− ptail) the law
of motion given by equation (5.7). With probability ptail, the household looses its stock
investment (s′ = 0), and the law of motion of the household financial wealth is given by
x′ = (1 + rf )b′.
The Bellman equation V outa (x, z) is the indirect utility of a a-year old household who
does not invest in risky assets, has labor productivity z and financial wealth x. It is
computed by solving the following maximization problem:
V outa (x, z) = max
c,b′
U(c) + βa+1Ez′Va+1(x
′, z′) (5.8)
where
x′ = (1 + rf )b′. (5.9)
The budget constraint of the household problem reads as follows:
c+ 1′(s′ + q) + b′ = wz + x, (5.10)
20Details on the estimation of the age-dependent component of labor income and the variances of the
transitory and permanent shocks to labor income are in the Appendix A.1.
21We drop the indices i and a, to lighten the notation, and index one period ahead variable as x′ instead
of xa+1.
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The Bellman equation Va(x, z) for the household problem pins down the participation
decision of the household problem.
Va(x, z) = max
1′={1,0}
(V ina (x, z);V
out
a (x, z)) (5.11)
The optimal policy correspondence 1 for the participation decision is obtained as fol-
lows:
1′ =
{
1, if x ∈ Xp,
0, otherwise.
where Xp ≡ {x : V ina (x, z) > V outa (x, z)}. (5.12)
The maximization problem of the retired households is analogous to the above formu-
lation with the only difference that the uncertainty with regard to the realization of the
income shocks is shut down and replaced with a deterministic income that is equal to a
fraction φret of the last working age year labor income.
5.4 Solution method
The problem is solved by backward induction. Given the terminal condition, the policy
functions and the value function in the final period T are trivial: households consume all
their wealth, and the value function equals to the utility function. We substitute this value
function in the Bellman equation and compute the policy functions one period backward.
We do this for 75 periods, from T = 100 to age Tb = 25. We discretize the state space for
cash-on-hand state variable and iterate on the value function. The density function for
the labor income process as well as for the risky return is approximated using Gaussian
quadrature. Finally, we simulate 10,000 agents, compute averages and confront the model
averages with the age profiles estimated in Section 4.
5.5 Parametrization
The parameters that we have estimated outside our model or imposed are reported in
Table 5.1. The first four parameters reported are fixed. In line with Norwegian law, we
set the retirement age at 67 for all households. The risk free rate (rf ) is set at 1.8% and
the equity premium (rp) at 3% as documented by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008)
for Norway.22 The standard deviation of the return on the risky assets is set to 0.231,
the standard deviation of returns on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The conditional survival
probabilities (pj in equation 5.1) are obtained from the Population Tables of Statistics
Norway.23
The last five parameters in Table 5.1 are estimated from our dataset. The age profile
and the variances of permanent (σ2p) and transitory shocks (σ
2
t ) to labor income are ob-
tained by applying to our measure of disposable household labor income the decomposition
used by Carroll (1997) and Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) (see Appendix A.1 for
details).24 Our estimates of the variances of labor income shocks are very close to those
obtained by Blundell, Graber, and Mogstad (2013) who use the same data source, but a
different methodology.
22These are historical values for the (average) risk free rate and risk premium
23Table 5 Life tables, 2010 Statistics Norway
24In Table 5.1, we report only the variances of permanent and transitory shocks to labor income for the
whole population; in Appendix A.1 a similar exercise has been done by education group.
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The replacement rate φret is pinned down by computing the ratio of mean pension
income five years after retirement and mean labor income five years prior to retirement.
The age profile of labor income is obtained from the fitted age polynomial for all the
population as documented in Table A.2.
For the purpose of our simulations, we require an estimate of the wealth of the house-
holds at age 25. For this, we fit a Pareto distribution to the wealth distribution of house-
hold aged 25 in our sample, and obtain an estimate of shape µx0 and scale σx0 parameters,
which we then use to randomly assign initial wealth to each household.
Table 5.1: Parameter choice
Variable Name Variable Value Source
Retirement age T r 67 Norwegian Law
Risk free return rf 0.018 Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008)
Risk premium rp 0.03 Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008)
Std deviation stock return σr 0.231 Data - Oslo Stock Exchange
Variance of transitory shocks σ2t 0.023 Table A.1
Variance of persistent shocks σ2p 0.012 Table A.1
Income share of retired HH φret 0.842 Table A.2
Shape of Pareto Distribution for x0 µx0 0.4521 Data - Wealth at age 25
Scale of Pareto Distribution for x0 σx0 5711.7 Data - Wealth at age 25
Finally, we parametrize the discount factor β, the risk aversion parameter γ, the par-
ticipation cost q and the disaster probability ptail. In order to illustrate the role played by
the per period cost and the tail-event probability in the model, we set the values of these
parameters to standard values in the literature. In Section 6.3 we estimate them.
6 Results
This Section provides the solution to the model, and delivers the economic intuition behind
the decision rules of the households. To facilitate comparisons with the literature, our
analysis builds on Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and shows how the introduction
of the per period participation cost and the idiosyncratic tail-event probability contribute
to explaining the stylized facts obtained in Section 4.
6.1 Policy Functions
The four panels of Figure 6.1 plot the optimal portfolio share invested in risky assets
conditional on participating in the stock market as a function of cash-on-hand at a given
age. Each panel plots the optimal portfolio share for 3 models: first, the Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005) model parametrized to Norwegian data, second the same model
augmented by a fixed cost (and a participation decision), and finally the fully fledged
model as described in Section 5, with participation decision and idiosyncratic disaster
probability.25
25The policy functions are obtained by using parameters taken from Table 5.1 and β = .96, γ = 10 (as in
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), q = 0.25, which amounts to 250 US$ in 1995 prices, and ptail = 1%.
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Figure 6.1: Policy Functions - Conditional Risky Share
The optimal portfolio rule is decreasing with both cash-on-hand, and age, a pattern
that is consistent with the literature (amongst others, Merton 1971). The key driver is
the importance of human capital (discounted stream of future labor income) relative to
accumulated wealth. During working age, since shocks to labor income are uncorrelated
with stock market returns, the deterministic component of labor income mimics the pay-
off of a risk free asset. Therefore, for a given level of human capital, households with low
levels of financial wealth have a relatively large amount of future income from risk free
assets (relative to their financial wealth) and thus invest more aggressively in stocks than
wealthier households. A higher level of financial wealth reduces the relative importance of
the safe human capital and leads households to rebalance their portfolio by investing less
in stocks relative to their financial wealth.
As for the negative correlation with age, this follows from the same logic. The portfolio
rule is less aggressive when agents grow older because the capitalized value of labor income
drops with age, and households compensate for this drop in bond-like wealth by reducing
their relative holding of risky assets.
The inclusion of a per-period participation cost introduces a wealth-participation
threshold (Figure 6.2).26 Overall, the wealth threshold of participation is mildly U-shaped
with respect to age. The main drivers behind the U-shaped pattern of the participation
threshold are jointly the hump-shaped labor income process, the age dependent discount-
ing factor, and the diversification channel (young households seeking to hold equity more
aggressively than older households). At early working age, labor income is low making
it relatively expensive for households to participate. A higher labor income and a higher
optimal risky share make stock market participation more worthwhile, which leads to a
26The participation thresholds can also be visualized in Figure 6.1 where they are the vertical cut-off
line of the conditional risky share policy functions.
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Figure 6.2: Wealth threshold of participation as a function of age
drop in the age-dependent wealth threshold. With increased age, households discount
the future more (because of higher mortality risk), have lower optimal risky share, and
lower labor incomes. These three facts jointly make participation less worthwhile for old
households and consequently increases the wealth threshold of participation.
The introduction of individual disaster probabilities has three distinct effects. First,
from Figure 6.1 one can notice that the idiosyncratic disaster probability has a stronger
effect on the optimal conditional risky share of young households relative to old house-
holds. This asymmetry arises because the high level of human wealth relatively to financial
wealth among younger household increases their optimal risky shares above that of older
households, meaning that they have more to lose from a disaster event, and therefore
reduce their optimal risky share more strongly than older households. Second, the de-
fault probability makes stock market participation a less attractive choice, by reducing
the expected return from holding stocks, which explains why at all ages the wealth thresh-
old of participation is higher than the thresholds from the model with participation cost
only (see Figure 6.2). Third, it is striking from both Figure 6.1 and 6.2 that the inter-
play between the participation cost and the default probability is significantly stronger
for older households than young ones. The interplay between the default friction and the
participation cost on the conditional risky share is well understood in the stylized model
presented in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008). However, its age dependent aspect
is novel. This asymmetry is driven by two facts. First, because retired households rely
heavily on accumulated assets to finance their consumption, a disaster event would hurt
them substantially more than young households. Second, retired households have a sub-
stantially lower optimal risky share, implying that they need to invest substantially more
than young households to benefit from the equity premium and cover the participation
cost.
Overall, the policy functions show that the fixed per period participation cost can
induce stock market entry and exit over the life-cycle, leaving the conditional risky share
unaffected, whereas the idiosyncratic default probability has both an impact on the average
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behavior of the participation margin and the conditional risky share. These differential re-
sponses of the share and participation will ease the identification of the disaster probability
and the participation cost when we estimate them in Section 6.3.
6.2 Simulations
To highlight the role of per period participation costs and the disaster probability for the
age profiles of participation and the conditional share, Figure 6.3 plots the average stock
market participation rate (upper panel) and the average conditional risky share (lower
panel) of simulated panels of 10,000 households from three models: the Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005) model calibrated to Norwegian data, the same model augmented
with a per period fixed stock market participation cost and for the model presented in
Section 5 which incorporates both the participation cost and the tail event.
There are a number of interesting features that emerge from the upper panel of Figure
6.3. First and obviously, in the absence of participation costs, the participation rate is
100% at all ages. Second, introducing a fixed per period participation cost generates lim-
ited participation. This effect is marked among the young because of the their low levels
of cash on hand. The per period cost generates also exit among the elderly, giving rise to
a hump-shaped participation profile. However, for the assumed level of participation cost
(250 US dollars, as estimated for the US by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)) the hump in partic-
ipation is much less pronounced and exit from the market takes place at a later age than
observed in the data. This property does not change even if we double the participation
cost suggesting that a reasonable participation cost is not sufficient to produce exit at the
time and rate that we observe. Third, when we also add the small idiosyncratic disaster
probability the simulated profile shows rapid exit initiating around retirement - a feature
that is consistent with the data - while leaving the pattern of participation among the
young barely affected. This is because the idiosyncratic disaster probability affects the
participation rate of old households substantially more than younger households, a reflec-
tion of the age dependence of participation threshold depicted in Figure 6.2 and discussed
in the previous subsection.
The lower panel of Figure 6.3 plots the average conditional risky share of the simulated
panel by age. There are three noteworthy features. First, adding participation costs to the
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) model leaves the level of the conditional share and
its age profile little affected. The share is very (and unrealistically) high - hitting 100% - at
relatively young age but households start rebalancing gradually until retirement. Second,
introducing the small tail event probability lowers the conditional share at all ages towards
levels that come closer to those observed in the data while the pattern of rebalancing as
households approach and foresee retirement is unchanged. Third, on average, rebalancing
of the risky share starts around the late thirties, much before households start exiting the
stock market.
Looking jointly at the simulated life cycle profile of participation and of the conditional
share reveals that the participation cost and the small probability tail event can together
reproduce qualitatively, with one exception, the pattern and timing of portfolio adjustment
along the intensive and the extensive margins documented in Section 4. The exception is
that while the conditional share at the beginning of the life cycle is flat in the data (see
Figure 4.1), it is increasing in the model. However, the model replicates well the joint
pattern of life cycle rebalancing and exit. A key finding in the Norwegian data is that
households first start reducing the conditional share before retirement, and later they
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Figure 6.3: Model Simulation
begin exiting the stock market after retirement. This qualitative ability of the model to
reproduce the empirical timing of the double adjustment is the main contribution of this
section of the paper. We now move to assessing the ability of our model to quantitatively
reproduce the empirical patterns identified in Section 4.
6.3 Estimation
In this subsection, we use indirect inference to estimate a set of unobserved parameters
κ = [γ, β, q, ptail], namely risk aversion, discount factor, fixed participation cost and id-
iosyncratic tail event probability, such that the model matches the targeted moments
best.
These set of target moments, denoted ΘD, are the stylized facts obtained in Section 3.
From the Heckman selection model, and based on our identification strategy, we recover
the age profile of the risky share and the participation decision. We then construct the
model counterpart of our target moments: based on a draw of κ we solve and simulate
the model presented in Section 5. From the model simulation, we obtain an average
participation rate and an average conditional share at each age ΘM (κ).
The estimation pins down κ? so as to minimize the distance between moments from a
simulated model ΘM (κ) and moments from the data ΘD:
κ? = arg min
κ
(ΘD −ΘM (κ))′W (ΘD −ΘM (κ))
where W is a weighting matrix, which is the identity matrix. The minimization pro-
cedure is performed using the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm.
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings of our structural estimations. In the first three
estimations, we target the age profiles estimates under the Deaton and Paxson (1994)
restriction (DP); in Estimation 4 those generated using the cohort proxy (CP). For the
first two estimations, we impose a value for the disaster probability of 1.75% and zero; the
first corresponds to the value computed by Barro (2006) by pooling historical data for 35
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Table 6.1: Structural estimation of parameters
Variable Data CGM Est. 1 Est. 2 Est. 3 Est. 4 Est. 5
Risk aversion (γ) - 10 7.5 17.3 10.4 12.5 13.3
Participation cost (q) in US$ - n/a 17.1 119.8 24.5 14.1 29.1
Discount factor (β) - 0.89 0.91 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.86
Probability of tail event (ptail) in% - n/a 1.75 0 1.3 1.4 1.34
Fraction of stock investment lost (θ) in% - n/a 100 n/a 100 100 78
Value of Objective Function - - 2.93 4.91 2.86 2.26 2.97
Target Data - - DP DP DP CP DP
Mean wealth to income ratio (age 65) 1.62 2.23 1.74 3.07 1.75 1.71 1.81
Std. dev. of log wealth (age 65) 1.77 0.78 0.79 1.01 0.795 0.789 0.783
Note: Parameters with x are fixed parameters. ’Target Data’ indicates whether the target moments are
taken from Deaton-Paxson methodology (DP) or from our Cohort Proxy (CP) identification strategies
developed in Section 4.
countries and defining a macroeconomic ”disaster” as a drop in GDP of at least 15% in
a year respectively; the second to no disaster. A comparison of the two sets of estimates
shows clearly that a small tail event probability allows to obtain more moderate estimates
of the degree of risk aversion and of the participation cost. Forcing ptail = 0 (instead
of 1.75%) results in an increase in the estimate risk aversion from 7.5 to 17.3 and of
the participation cost from $17.1 to $119.8 per year (1995 prices). The other two columns
estimate the four parameters jointly. In our context, the low probability tail event does not
necessarily originate from a very adverse macroeconomic shock but rather from extreme
idiosyncratic investment experiences, including frauds. Because direct estimates of the
probability of these tail events are difficult, we let the structural estimates speak. 27 The
two sets of estimates yield very similar results. The low-tail event probability is estimated
between 1.3 and 1.4 percent and the participation cost is comprised between $14 and $25,
while the risk aversion parameter is around 10 and the discount factor between 0.85 and
0.89. Table 6.1 instructs us that a relatively low idiosyncratic disaster probability enhances
the quantitative performance substantially. Comparing Estimation 2 with Estimation 3
shows that a 1.3% probability of a large loss reduces the objective function by a factor
close to 2, and more importantly allows to obtain estimates for the preference parameters
that are in line with the literature (for instance Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) use
a β of 0.93 and a γ of 10).
Finally, we jointly estimate the fraction of stocks lost when the rare event occurs and
its probability. Whereas in Estimations 1, 3 and 4, we posited that when the tail-event
occurs, the whole investment in stocks is lost, and that household’s next period’s financial
wealth is only composed of accrued interest on bonds, in Estimation 5, we relax this
27While deception and fraud is likely to be pervasive in financial markets, systematic evidence is hard
to collect. Survey data from the European Social Survey show that about 1/3 of the people interviewed
report, that over the past five years, they experienced that a bank or insurance company failed to offer
the best deal they were entitled to. This corresponds to an annual probability of around 6%, but refers
to a much broader notion of the type of frauds that we want to capture. The Financial Fraud Research
Center at Stanford University reports estimates of 7.1% of Americans incurring at least one financial fraud
over their lifetime and 13.5% a generic fraud every year (http://fraudresearchcenter.org/2011/08/
state-of-research-2/). Estimates of the size of fraud losses are as difficult. However, they are unlikely
to be negligible. The Bernie Madoff case alone resulted in $50 billion losses, around 0.8% of the value of
households investments in stocks.
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Figure 6.4: Model simulations and data using the parameters from Estimation 3 and 4
assumption, and indirectly infer the fraction of stocks lost that fits our stylized facts best.28
We estimate a fraction lost of 78% and a probability of this tail event of around 1.34%.
All our estimates remain close to those from Estimation 3 apart from the risk aversion
parameter. This nuances the point made above which emphasized the importance of the
idiosyncratic probability in aligning preference parameters to those of the literature. In
fact, our estimates suggest that a small probability of a large loss when investing in stocks,
a small participation cost, a relatively large degree of risk aversion and a discount factor in
line with standard estimates, is the parameter combination that gets the life cycle profiles
of stock market participation and the conditional share generated by the model closest
to the the empirically estimated life cycle profile of the risky share and stock market
participation.
Figure 6.4 contrasts the model-generated age profiles using the set of estimated pa-
rameters and the data-estimated profiles for the two estimations set (Estimation 3 and
4). The model simulated profiles approximate our stylized facts well. In particular, they
reproduce closely the hump-shaped pattern of the participation rate and capture the dif-
ferential timing when people start rebalancing the share and existing the stock market
quite well. Yet, the simulated behaviour of the conditional risky fits poorly the observed
one. Compared to the data, the model predicts a too low share in stocks when young and
a too high one for people in the middle ages.
The last two lines of Table 6.1 show two moments that we did not target: the wealth
to income ratio at age 65 and the standard deviation of wealth at the same age. The
model generates a value for the first moment (1.75, Estimation 3) that is quite close to the
observed value (1.62) but predicts considerably less wealth inequality (0.795, Estimation
3) than observed in the data (1.77). Yet, it is interesting to notice that allowing for a
small disaster probability considerably improves the ability of the model to reproduce the
observed wealth to income ratio.
28In this modelling environment x′ = (1 + rf )b′ + (1− θ)s′, where θ is the fraction of stock investment
lost when the tail event occurs.
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7 Conclusion
Over the past decade, many scholars have used calibrated models to study life cycle portfo-
lio allocations, departing from the simplifying assumptions of early generations models and
adding realistic features of households environments. Among them, uninsurable income
risk, non-tradeable human capital and borrowing constraints. Despite these (and other)
complications, these models uniformly predict that households should at a certain point
before retirement start lowering exposure to the stock market in order to compensate for
the decline in the stock of human wealth as people age, which in this models acts mostly
as a risk-free asset. Finding empirical evidence in support of this rebalancing, however,
has been hard. We have argued that this is likely to be due to data limitations, both
because a proper treatment of the issue requires long longitudinal data and because the
information on assets needs to be exhaustive and free of measurement error. Combining
administrative and tax registry data from Norway, we are fulfilling these requirements and
find that households do indeed manage their portfolio over the life cycle in a way that is
consistent with model predictions. We find that they adjust their financial portfolios along
two margins: the share invested if they participate in the stock market and the decision
whether to stay or leave the market altogether. They tend to enter the stock market early
in life as they accumulate assets and tend to invest a relatively large share of financial
wealth in stocks. As they start foreseeing retirement, they rebalance their portfolio share,
reducing it gradually. Around retirement, they start adjusting on the other margin, exit-
ing the stock market. This double adjustment pattern along the intensive and extensive
margin with its clear timing cannot be explained by any of the available life-cycle portfolio
models; however as we show, an extension of these models that incorporates a small per
period participation cost and a small probability of a large loss when investing in stocks
is able not only to generate the double pattern of adjustment but also to replicate the
profiles of stock market participation and portfolio shares observed in the data.
A Appendix: earnings variances and human wealth
To estimate the variance of permanent and transitory shocks to labor income and the
value of a households human wealth, we rely on a broad measure of household labor
income obtained from tax records by summing the labor income of the two spouses for
all households in our portfolio sample. The income data cover the same time span we
observe the households portfolio. As in Carroll (1997), we define labor income as the sum
of after-tax earnings at the household level. Besides earnings, it includes capital income
and transfers (including sickness money, compensation for maternity leave, benefits paid
during unemployment spells and pensions). Values are in 1995 USD - converted using the
1995 NOK/USD exchange rate. The statutory retirement age in Norway is 67, in practice
however, a number of arrangements allow workers to retire earlier.29 Our measure is then
deflated using the growth in the National Insurance Scheme basic amount, which is used
to adjust payments of unemployment insurance and pensions.30
29In Norway, the actual average retirement age is around 64. See e.g.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf. Early retirement
schemes are widespread in Norway and workers may be eligible for these from the age of 62, see e.g.
Vestad (2013)
30See The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration,
http://www.nav.no/English/Membership+in+The+National+Insurance+Scheme for more information on
34
A.1 Variance of permanent and transitory shocks to labor income
Following Carroll (1997) and Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), we estimate the fol-
lowing model for (log) labor income, Yi,a,t for household i , aged a at time t :
log(Yi,a,t) = α+ β(Xi,a,t) + θa + γt + εi,a,t (A.1)
where α is a constant, Xi,a,t a set of demographic controls (such as household size),
θa a full set of age dummies, γt the calendar year fixed effects and εi,a,t the error term
capturing shocks to labor income. We estimate the model separately for three different
levels of educational attainment of the household (using husband education), as well as
for the whole sample of non-retired households.31.
To estimate the variance components of the income process, we follow the procedure
in Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and assume that
labor income innovations can be decomposed as the sum of a permanent and a transitory
shock, with variances σ2u and σ
2
η respectively. Using the estimated model we compute
for each observation prediction errors d-years ahead -denoted rid - for various d starting
from the base year (1995); then, noticing that var(rid) = dσ
2
u+ 2σ
2
η, we retrieve the two
variances from an OLS regression of var(rid) on d and a constant term. The estimates are
shown in Table A.1. The variance of transitory shocks is larger than that of permanent
shocks for all education groups as well as the total sample, with some differences in its
extent. We do not find large differences in the size of the variances across education groups
with a tendency of households with High-School education to face lower labor income
uncertainty than either households with less than high school of households with a college
degree. Compared to Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), we find much lower values
of the transitory components.32 There are two possible explanations. The first is that
workers in Norway are covered by a generous social insurance scheme which dampens the
labor income effects of temporary shocks. The second that, differently from Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005) who use PSID surveys, we use administrative records. Hence there
is much less scope for measurement errors which otherwise inflates the estimated variance
of transitory shocks.
Our estimates of the variance of permanent and transitory shocks are instead very
close to those of Blundell, Graber, and Mogstad (2013) based on the same Norwegian data
that we use, but obtained using a different methodology and excluding income from self
employment. Unlike us, they allow for age-varying variances, finding that the earnings
variances follow a U-shaped profile. Variances are higher at the very beginning of the
(working) life cycle (particularly for high education workers) and essentially age-invariant
for many years before retirement when they increase again. Our estimates are similar to
their for middle aged households.
Finally, we also computed the correlation between labor income and stock market
returns on the Norwegian stock market. A negative correlation would represent a hedging
the basic amount, ’grunnbeløpet’.
31In fact, we cut the sample at the age of 65, to avoid variability in income coming from early retirement
from influencing our results
32The estimates of the income variance are highly dependent on very low income realizations of few
households. In previous contributions this has been taken care of by excluding households with realized
incomes below some threshold, justifying the choice with the need to limit the influence of measurement
error. Since we use highly reliable administrative records we retain the whole sample, including households
with very low income realizations.
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Table A.1: Income variance decomposition and correlation
with stock return
<High School High School College All
Transitory 0.026 0.015 0.029 0.023
(9.97) (6.76) (11.89) (16.5)
Permanent 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.012
(17.44) (19.12) (17.73) (31.11)
Stock Market 0.017 0.045 0.005 0.008
(0.48) (0.34) (0.75) (0.50)
Note: The table reports estimates of the variance of permanent and transitory
labor income shocks. The estimation is based on the error terms from esti-
mating the labor income process in Figure A.1. The procedure is based on the
method in Carroll and Samwick (1997), which is also used in Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005). T-values in parentheses.
Table A.2: Age polynomials for labor income process
Less High School High School College All
Age 0.0418 0.0375 0.112 0.0572
Age2/10 -0.0231 -0.0176 -0.0689 -0.0308
Age3/100 0.00587 0.00454 0.0212 0.00888
Age4/1000 -0.101 -0.0906 -0.337 -0.161
Age5/10000 0.0749 0.0735 0.208 0.117
Constant 3.576 3.657 3.415 3.566
Observations 61 61 61 61
r2 0.995 0.996 0.988 0.995
Note: The table shows the coefficients of a 5th order polynomial describing labor
income as a function of age.
opportunity for the households, as argued in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). Table
A.1 shows that the correlation tends to be positive but very small and never statistically
significant. This confirms the results in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) for the
United States.33
A.2 Human wealth
To obtain an estimate of the human wealth of a household of age a we estimate Equation
5.7 on the whole sample of households aged between 25 and 80 and separately for the
three education groups. We then retrieve the age dummies and regress them on a 5th
order polynomial. The age effects (solid lines) and the fitted polynomials are plotted in
Figure A.1. Table A.2 shows the estimated 5th order polynomial.
33The same holds for a combined measure of returns from the S& P 500 and the Oslo stock exchange.
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Figure A.1: Life Cycle Profiles for Income and Human Wealth
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Note: The left panel of the Figure plots the estimated labor income processes by educational level and for
the full sample, coming from Equation A.1 estimated on the different sub-samples. The right panel displays
the life cycle profiles of human wealth, calculated as described in Guiso and Sodini (2011) (Equations A.2
& A.3) based on the income polynomials in the left panel.
The income profiles by educational attainment are consistent with the evidence in the
literature showing much steeper profiles for high education workers. To compute lifetime
wealth we proceed as follows. Let Ge(a) denote the estimated 5th order polynomial in age
for log income for a households with education level e. Assuming that all the household
characteristics apart from age will not change in the future the labor income (or pension
benefits) at age a + τ of a household with education level e and age a can be calculated
using the function Ge(a) as follows:
Le(a+ τ) = Le(a)
exp(Ge(a+ τ))
exp(Ge(a))
(A.2)
The human wealth for a households of age a is then computed as:
He,a = Le(a) +
T−a∑
τ=1
p(a+ τ |a)Le(a+ τ)
(1 + r)
(A.3)
where p(a+ τ |a) is the probability of surviving to age a+ τ conditional on survival to
a, from the population tables of Statistics Norway34 and r is a risk free rate, which we set
at 0.02. For each household we obtain an estimate of He,a for each age of household in
the sample.
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